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How Legal Intermediaries Facilitate or Inhibit Social Change  
 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
 
 This article explores how legal intermediaries facilitate or inhibit social 
change. We suggest the increasing complexity and ambiguity of legal rules 
coupled with the shift from government to governance provides legal in-
termediaries greater opportunities to influence law and social change. Dra-
wing from new institutional sociology, we suggest rule intermediaries shape 
legal and social change, with varying degrees of success, in two ways:  
(1) law is filtered through non-legal logics emanating from various organi-
zational fields; (2) law is professionalized and increasingly filtered through 
and by non-legal professionals with varying degrees of connection to law. 
We draw from case studies in the United States and France to show how 
intermediaries facilitate or inhibit social change.  
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Introduction 
For decades, scholars have been debating law’s capacity to produce social 
change - that is, change that increases social justice, equality and fair go-
vernance in society. At the core of the debate is the role that public legal 
institutions such as legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts play in 
articulating and setting the course for social change. Legislation, regulation, 
and litigation are important instruments of social change in various elements 
of social life such as education, health care, housing, transportation, race re-
lations, and the environment. Formal legal reforms can also be used symbo-
lically to organize political and social movements (Williams, 1991; McCann, 
1994; Commaille, 2015). Moreover, law’s subtle influence on the social in-
teractions of everyday life increase the potential for social change (Engel & 
Munger, 1996; 2003).   
Despite significant judicial decisions and legislation, law and society scho-
lars often question law’s capacity to produce social change. Some argue that 
legal change developed by formal legal institutions produced little impro-
vement in the economic and social circumstances of disadvantaged commu-
nities (Rosenberg, 1991). Other scholars argue that reliance on rights rhetoric 
reinforces and legitimates a legal system that masks inequality (Kairys, 1982; 
Bourdieu, 1986). In addition to maintaining existing legal inequality, legal 
rights can also be ambiguous “weapons” (Israël, 2009), a “myth” (Schein-
gold 1974) and psychologically costly to those who claim them (Bumiller, 
1988). Others note that the characteristics of parties also limit law’s capacity 
to bring about social change, with particular advantages inherent to repeat 
players that have greater resources, knowledge, and experience with legal 
institutions (Galanter, 1974). 
Recognizing law as not simply top-down and emanating from public legal 
institutions, existing research increasingly suggests that law shapes social 
actions and institutions through constitutive, cognitive, instrumental and nor-
mative mechanisms (Stryker, 2003, 2007). These frameworks lay the foun-
dation for two overlapping processes through which economic and legal ins-
titutions, actors, interests and norms attempt to influence law and social 
change (Edelman & Stryker, 2005; Stryker, 2007).  On the one hand, cultural 
meaning making and institutional diffusion play a role and on the other hand, 
political resource mobilization and counter-mobilization also play a role. 
Working within this broader framework, scholars are increasingly exploring 
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the role that legal intermediaries play between the law on the books and the 
law in action. 
Political scientists and sociologists have made important contributions in this 
vein. Political scientists often focus on the role intermediaries play not just 
in the lobbying process, but in implementing and monitoring law that is 
created by “rule-makers” for “rule-takers” in regulatory settings (Abbott et 
al., 2017). Sociologists focus more on cultural meaning making and institu-
tional politics, (Dobbin, 2009; Dobbin and Dowd, 2000, Stryker, 2000) and 
emphasize reframing, diffusion, loose coupling and the managerialization of 
law by private organizations (Edelman 2016). As insightful as these ap-
proaches are, much work remains to be done. In particular, although existing 
approaches in political science examine regulatory intermediaries, it is still 
within a framework that views law as a “top-down” process coming from 
public legal institutions. Conversely, while sociologists have revealed some 
mechanisms through which intermediaries impact law and social change, 
empirical research in this vein has largely been confined to labor and em-
ployment law (Edelman, 2016; Dobbin, 2009; Stryker, 2007). 
In contrast to these approaches, we center our analysis around three primary 
concerns. First, we need to understand the conditions that make it more likely 
that intermediaries will impact law’s capacity to produce or inhibit social 
change. Second, to the extent that normative, instrumental, cultural, political, 
and constitutive processes impact law’s capacity to produce social change, 
we need to examine the mechanisms that drive those processes and the role 
that intermediaries play. Third, far more empirical research should focus on 
the role that legal intermediaries play in facilitating and inhibiting social 
change across a wide variety of social institutions. 
We identify these areas as especially important because the location of 
lawmaking, interpretation, and implementation across the world has changed 
and shifted toward public-private partnerships and the contracting out of go-
vernmental services to civil society actors and organizations. Too often scho-
lars and policymakers focus on the role that public legal institutions play in 
facilitating or inhibiting social change without a closer interrogation of the 
series of non-legal actors within society that are tasked with interpreting, im-
plementing, and even shaping the meaning of legal rules in society. These 
professionals in various industries manage legal requirements and handle 
law-related complaints. 
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This article argues that rule intermediaries, i.e., state, business, and civil so-
ciety actors that affect, control or monitor how legal rules are interpreted, 
implemented or constructed once they are passed by public legal institutions, 
facilitate and inhibit social change in society. In doing so, we pivot the dis-
cussion about law and social change away from debates about the power of 
formal legal institutions to effectuate social change. We also pivot away from 
general normative, instrumental, cognitive or political theories to explain so-
cial change. Because legal and social rules, concepts, routines and institu-
tions are reciprocally or mutually constructed over time, it does not make 
sense to treat law as only an “independent” variable and social change as 
only a “dependent variable.” A theory of law and social change should theo-
rize and research how law, politics, and social culture and their interplay 
shape the nature of and causal relationships among legal variables and social 
change variables. Moreover, we focus on and limit our analysis to the pro-
cesses and social mechanisms through which intermediaries facilitate and 
inhibit social change. Consistent with prior approaches, we view “social me-
chanisms as composed of chains or aggregations of actors confronting pro-
blem situations” that mediate between causes and effects (Gross 2009, 368). 
We argue that legal intermediaries are the key actors on the chain between 
law and social change, and try to more precisely reveal how intermediary’s 
professional experience, institutional logics, and understandings of law and 
compliance facilitate and inhibit social change in different situations. 
We begin by articulating the conditions that have led to the increasing im-
portance of intermediaries in relation to law and social change. We suggest 
that three conditions have made intermediaries more likely to play a role in 
shaping legal and social change: the global shift from government to go-
vernance, the inherent ambiguity in legal rules, and the increasing com-
plexity of legal rules. We argue that the interaction of these three elements 
have created greater space for non-traditional actors to emerge and influence 
law. In particular, a wide-variety of legal and non-legal actors among and 
within organizations that come into contact with law have increasing discre-
tion in their legal environments. 
We then offer a new institutional theory of legal intermediaries and social 
change. Drawing from new institutional organizational sociology, we set 
forth a theoretical framework for understanding the legal intermediary’s role 
in facilitating or inhibiting social change as a process and proceed to specify 
the mechanisms through which intermediaries facilitate and inhibit social 
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change. We note that our definition of progressive social change is broad, 
including instrumental, political, and cultural considerations (Kostiner 
2003). Under this definition, social changes consists of providing concrete 
resources such as jobs, health care, and education to marginalized people, 
providing ways for marginalized people to be empowered, united and politi-
cally mobilized, and emphasizing the need to transform individual and col-
lective identities and assumptions in society (Kostiner 2003). 
We suggest rule intermediaries shape legal and social change, with varying 
degrees of success, in two primary ways: (1) law is filtered through non-legal 
logics emanating from various organizational fields; (2) law is professiona-
lized by non-legal actors, that is, law is increasingly filtered through and by 
professionals with varying degrees of connection to law. By non-legal actors, 
we mean actors who are not working or inscribed in the legal field as profes-
sionals such as lawyers, judges, legislators, or others.1 To show the expansive 
arc of legal intermediaries, we examine how professionalization and the fil-
tering of non-legal logics work hand-in-hand to facilitate and inhibit social 
change across a range of subject areas including employment, labor, corpo-
rate governance, health, safety, privacy, and consumer protection. We ex-
plore how legal intermediaries influence the law on the books, the law in 
action, and legality itself in different institutional environments. 
The final section discusses the implications of our framework for studies of 
legal intermediaries and the relationship between law and social change. 
While normative, instrumental, political and cultural processes through 
which law produces social change remain important (Edelman, 2016; Dob-
bin, 2009, Stryker et al., 2012), our approach helps explain the underlying 
mechanisms that drive those different processes. In particular, political, cul-
tural and institutional theories through which law is influenced are often de-
rived from and influenced by the increasing professionalization of law by 
non-legal actors and how these non-legal actors encounter and filter what 
law means through non-legal logics. By highlighting the conditions that lead 
to greater legal intermediation and the particular processes and mechanisms 
through which intermediaries can facilitate and inhibit social change, we set 
forth a framework for scholars to use in future studies of intermediaries. 
                                                 
1 These legal professionals develop specific logics related to their belonging to the 
legal field (Bourdieu, 1986). 
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The Conditions that Lead to the Increasing Role of Intermediaries 
This section answers the following questions: Why should scholars of law 
and social change focus on intermediaries? What are the conditions that have 
led to increasing involvement by intermediaries in not just implementation 
of legal rules, but law’s construction and meaning? We view these questions 
as essential to understanding how different kinds of legal intermediaries ope-
rating in different institutional and social environments facilitate and inhibit 
social change. We argue that analysis of law and social change needs to focus 
less on public legal institutions and more on the rising role of intermediaries 
because the location of “lawmaking” has shifted. In particular, the regulatory 
environment has gradually moved from a government to governance model 
that places a greater role on legal and non-legal actors tasked with interpre-
ting, implementing and constructing law. Coupled with the inherent ambi-
guity of legal rules regulating organizations and the increasing complexity 
of legal rules, the changing regulatory state provides greater space for in-
termediaries to intervene. 
For much of the twentieth century, scholars across a variety of disciplines 
studied law as a “top-down” process, a system of rules coming from the com-
mand of government or, more precisely, public legal institutions. Traditional 
instruments of lawmaking by public legal institutions such as legislatures, 
courts and administrative agencies include formal rules and stipulations, ad-
versarial methods, enforceable means of dispute resolution and command-
and-control regulatory mechanisms. Within this top-down framework, 
research focusing on public law often examines the relationship between bu-
sinesses and legal institutions and in particular, law’s capacity to produce 
social change. We note that the traditional top-down model was never abso-
lute, as socio-legal scholars often argue social change can shape law as well. 
Considerable theoretical and empirical focus is devoted to explaining the 
way interest groups, as intermediaries, directly participate in governmental 
processes such as legislatures and administrative agencies (Mills, 1956; 
Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963; Dahl, 1967; Shapiro, 1988). Interest group studies 
interested in understanding structural business power examine how business 
occupies a privileged position in society (Lindblom, 1977; Offerlé, 1994). 
Other scholars interested in instrumental aspects of business power examine 
how interest groups form advocacy coalitions that lobby, negotiate for favo-
rable laws, build (or set) an agenda in their strategic favor or exert direct 
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influence on government decisionmakers through campaign contributions 
(Kingdon, 1984; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Leech et al., 2002; Kamie-
niecki, 2006; Laurens, 2015). While instrumental, structural, and public 
choice approaches are all different, they each analyze interest groups as ra-
tional, strategic intermediaries seeking direct influence over governmental 
institutions. 
Faced with command-and-control regulatory mechanisms that include for-
mal rules and requirements, businesses try a variety of approaches to in-
fluence not just legislation but regulatory policy (Bernstein, 1955; Stigler, 
1971; Posner, 1974; Quirk, 1981; Vogel, 1989, 1995). Beginning in the 
1950s and 1960s, United States regulatory agencies became the subject of de-
bates between economic or capture-cartel theories and their critics (Herring, 
1936; Huntington, 1952; Bernstein, 1955; Kolko, 1965). Capture theory sug-
gests that regulation is “acquired by the industry” and designed and operated 
primarily for its benefit (Stigler, 1971, p. 3; Posner, 1974; Becker, 1983). 
Interest groups, public choice, and capture studies explain public law as a 
top-down process, where legislators and regulators try to coerce or in some 
cases encourage organizations to comply, while organizations engage in ra-
tional, strategic choices as to whether to comply and how to influence legal 
mandates (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004; Braithwaite, 2008). At all times, pu-
blic law is produced by government. In this view law is exogenous to orga-
nizations even as it is open to organizational influence. Thus, studies of go-
vernment made great strides in explaining how businesses directly influence 
government outputs, whether they are laws made by legislatures or legal 
rules implemented and enforced by administrative agencies. As mentioned 
earlier, much of the prior scholarship on law and social change analyzes the 
legal environment in terms of whether public legal institutions are capable 
of producing legal change. 
More recently, business and civil society actors’ relationship with regulatory 
institutions has undergone a dramatic shift due to the transformation of the 
regulatory state over the past thirty years. In particular, the location of go-
vernmental decisions shifted away from traditional public governmental ins-
titutions. The top-down “command-and-control” regulation of the 1960s and 
1970s spawned heightened capture and interest group pluralist behavior. In 
response to political change at the executive and congressional levels of go-
vernment, the 1980s and 1990s saw a shift toward free market capitalism, 
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privatization, and devolution to the private sector in the United States and 
Europe (Majone, 1997; Bignami 2004a, 2004b; Streeck & Thelen, 2004; 
Levi-Faur, 2005; Braithwaite, 2008). 
Despite popular belief that regulation was abandoned when neoliberalism 
was adopted around the Western world in the 1980s, empirical evidence sug-
gests that privatization, deregulation, and the nurturing of markets under neo-
liberal governments expanded and extended regulation across the world (Vo-
gel, 1996; Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004; Levi-Faur, 2005; Braithwaite, 2008; 
Parker & Nielsen, 2011). 
Thus, the alleged deregulation and move toward free markets led to a slow 
re-regulation of free markets in the form of softer, less stringent regulation 
aimed at perfecting market performance (Majone, 1997; Levi-Faur, 2005). 
Under a new era of public-private partnerships between corporations, state 
actors, civil society groups, non-governmental actors are taking a more ac-
tive role in governing themselves and trying to maintain the public good 
(Majone, 1997; Braithwaite, 2002; Lobel, 2004; Freeman, 1997, 2000; 
Sturm, 2001; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Benish, 2014). Scholars explored the role 
of “brokers of capitalism” in Europe by highlighting their lobbying and in-
fluence on the regulations adopted by the European Union (Laurens, 2015). 
Regulation is still an important component of governance, but governance 
schemes go beyond mere regulation because they are consensus oriented, 
deliberative, and aim to allow private industry more direct involvement and 
control in implementing public policies (Braithwaite, 1982; Kagan et al,, 
2003; Lobel, 2004; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Freeman and Minnow 2009). 
While regulatory capitalism and privatization are the reality (Levi-Faur, 
2005), soft, less aggressive regulation, rather than the state directly manda-
ting what is permitted or illegal to industry, is the expanding part of govern-
ment (Vogel, 1996; Levi-Faur, 2005; Schneiberg & Bartley, 2008). Formal 
laws and directives coming with the coercive backing of the state or a supra-
national entity like the European Union decline as states move toward a broa-
der conception that establishes non-binding rules such as standards and gui-
delines (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). Governance articulates the cons-
tellation of activities, functions, and exercise of control by both public and 
private actors in the promotion of social, political, and economic ends. 
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Empirical studies of governance highlight the new instruments and tech-
niques of regulation. These studies account for the new types of legality, in-
cluding negotiated rule-making, management-based regulation, and other re-
gulatory systems that try to follow the logic of governance (Coglianese, 
1997; Coglianese & Nash, 2001; Coglianese & Lazer, 2003; Howard-Gren-
ville, 2005; Gunningham, 1995; Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999, 2009; Ayres 
& Braithwaite, 1992; Lacoumes & Le Galès, 2005; Mockle, 2007; Halpern, 
Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2014). Because law was traditionally thought of as 
formed and defined outside of organizations and prior to reaching organiza-
tional domains, governance studies emphasize private organizations’ moti-
vations for complying or not complying (Simpson, 1992, 1998; Vaughan, 
1998; Parker & Nielsen, 2009, 2011; Gunningham et al., 2004; Haines, 
2009), social and legal license pressures (Kagan et al. 2003) or moral value 
laden concerns (Tyler, 1990). 
More recently, scholars are examining how state, business, and civil society 
actors act as “rule-intermediaries” that affect, control, or monitor relations 
between rule-makers and rule-takers (Abbott et al., 2017; Levi-Faur & Sta-
robin, 2014; Locke, 2013). This framework suggests that rule-makers create 
law for rule-takers and the rule intermediaries play a major role monitoring, 
verifying, testing, auditing, and certifying legal rules (Levi-Faur & Starobin, 
2014; Abbott et al., 2017). 
Scholarship on regulatory governance has done an excellent job of highligh-
ting the shift from government to governance. They have also highlighted 
how various interest groups and stakeholders as intermediaries often in-
fluence law through instrumental, political or even normative processes. 
However, scholarship in this vein has produced far more empirical research 
on the rise and character of governance than on its translation into practice 
(Schneiberg & Bartley, 2008). Moreover, existing approaches from political 
scientists studying regulatory governance and rule intermediaries still posi-
tion rulemaking as within the domain of public legal institutions as the rule-
makers. Whereas existing studies on intermediaries examine how in-
termediaries monitor, verify, or certify legal rules (Abbott et al., 2017), they 
have rarely examined the processes and mechanisms through which in-
termediaries shape the meaning of law itself and in doing so, facilitate and 
inhibit social change. Given the change in the regulatory state, there is far 
more room for stakeholders to actively shape and determine the degree to 
which various laws that are passed will shape social change (cf. Gilad 2014).  
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The changing structure of the regulatory state from government to go-
vernance is coupled with the fact that laws regulating society and businesses 
in particular, are often ambiguous as to how to comply with them and increa-
singly complex and technical. Thus, the potential for legal rules to be shaped 
by rule intermediaries is heightened by vague and ambiguous legal provi-
sions. Legislation is often unclear and judicial rulings interpreting ambi-
guous statutes often provide little guidance on how to translate and imple-
ment legal standards into everyday organizational practice (Edelman 1990, 
1992; Edelman & Talesh, 2011). In particular, statutes often constrain 
procedures more than substantive outcomes and focus on issues such as shif-
ting burdens of proof or the availability of various kinds of relief (Edelman 
& Talesh, 2011).2 Powerful laws are also often accompanied with weak or 
declining enforcement mechanisms. We are not suggesting that all laws are 
ambiguous and incapable of providing appropriate guidance to civil society 
actors. For example, administrative agencies often provide guidelines and 
regulations that help clarify the meaning of legal rules. Nonetheless, there is 
often considerable room for interpretation and construction of legal rules by 
intermediaries due to the lack of clarity.  
Laws and regulations are not just ambiguous with respect to how to comply 
with them; they are more complex than ever before (Ruhl & Katz, 2015; 
Schuck, 1992). Scholars across the world are increasingly examining the 
complexity of legal rules and its impact on judges and juries (Kades, 1997; 
Graff & Mestad 2014). Laws such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, the Foreign Corruption Practices Act, Bankruptcy laws, 
the United States Tax Code, the Wage and Hour Laws in France, the Regis-
tration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals in Europe 
and many other environmental laws across the world are dense, technical, 
complex, indeterminate and require specialized sets of knowledge. There has 
never been a time when law was considered completely simple. However, 
the growth of new industries, markets and technologies in areas such as in-
tellectual property, financial services, the internet, and transnational legal 
settings has caused formal and informal legal institutions to define the scope 
of permissible and impermissible behavior. A society concerned about va-
                                                 
2 Of course, shifting burdens of proof can matter in how much social change is pro-
duced (Stryker, 2001). 
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rious “risks” (Beck, 1986) has emerged and created the need to manage, re-
gulate, and govern these risks through various laws and legal rules which are 
increasingly complex, sophisticated, or technical. The rising complexity of 
legal rules requires greater specialization within the legal profession but also 
greater involvement and coordination with specific industries and the orga-
nizations that these laws impact.  
We suggest, therefore, that the evolution of the regulatory state from govern-
ment to governance plus the large number of ambiguous and complex legal 
rules have created conditions that lend themselves toward much greater in-
volvement by legal intermediaries. Under these conditions, organizations 
and civil society actors have tremendous discretion and opportunity to shape 
the meaning of legal rules. These are not necessary conditions, but they cer-
tainly are sufficient conditions that help us understand why rule intermedia-
tion by non-legal actors is more prevalent than ever before across the world.  
A New Institutional Theory of How Intermediaries Influence Law and 
Social Change 
Understanding Legal Intermediaries Through A New Institutional Lens 
This section draws from new institutional organizational sociology theories 
of law and organizations to explain how intermediaries facilitate and inhibit 
social change. After developing our framework, the following sections use 
empirical research to illustrate our argument. New institutionalists specify 
the institutional and political mechanisms through rule intermediaries such 
as private organizations and civil society actors shape the content of legal 
rules (Zeitlin, 2005; Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006; Schofer & McEneaney, 
2003; Parker, 2002; Stryker, 1994, 2000, 2002; Talesh, 2009; Bessy, Del-
peuch & Pélisse, 2011; Gilad, 2014); Edelman, 2016). Using concepts such 
as institutional logics and organizational fields,3 new institutionalists exa-
mine how organizations interact with their social and legal environment. This 
theory starts with a basic premise: laws regulating organizations are ambi-
guous, in that they often do not define the terms of compliance (Edelman, 
                                                 
3 An organizational field refers to the community of organizations that coexist and 
interact in some area of institutional life and share common systems of meaning, 
values, and norms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 1991; Scott and Meyer, 1991; Scott, 
2002; Scott et al., 2000). 
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1990, 1992). In these situations, organizations do not resist or avoid law, but 
instead, respond by creating written rules, procedures, and structures to fill 
in law’s meaning. As organizations legalize themselves, managerial and risk 
logics influence the way in which organizations understand law and com-
pliance (Pélisse, 2011b; Talesh, 2015a; Edelman, 2016). 
Although institutional logics do not emerge from organizational fields, they 
often are reshaped and customized in an organizational field through various 
mechanisms (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Early accounts of organizational 
fields emphasize the uniformity, taken-for-grantedness and institutional iso-
morphism that results in a dominant or settled logic within a field (Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1983). 
More recently, political sociologists and new institutionalists who study ins-
titutional change treat institutions as settlements of conflict among actors 
with differential power and competing frames (Stryker, 1994, 2000; 
Fligstein, 1996; Rao, 1998; Roy, 1997; Schneiberg & Bartley, 2001; Gilad, 
2014). Empirical studies demonstrate that institutional logics co-exist and 
co-evolve over time (Dunn & Jones, 2010) while often one institutionalized 
or dominant logic is replaced or abandoned for a new dominant logic (Have-
man & Rao, 1997; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton, 2002; Lounsbury, 
2002; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003). Moreover, field actors often mobilize 
multiple logics within organizational fields (McPherson & Sauder, 2013; 
Talesh, 2015c). 
Recent work in this area focuses attention on how organizational field logics 
influence the legal field, i.e., “the environment within which legal institu-
tions and legal actors and in which conceptions of legality and compliance 
evolve” (Edelman, 2007, 58). The tensions between the logics of organiza-
tional and legal fields, one anchored around efficiency and rationality, the 
other around rights and justice (and more recently informality in the form of 
alternative dispute resolution), come into play when organizational and legal 
actors and institutions interact (Edelman, 2007; Stryker, 1994, 2000; Pélisse, 
2011a; Talesh, 2012). 
In addition to focusing on the importance of institutionalized logics, prior 
new institutional research shows that the professions are key carriers of ideas 
among and across organizational fields. In particular, we have seen a profes-
sionalization of legal services by non-legal actors that operate and interact 
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with law in tangible ways. In particular, human resource officials, personnel 
managers, management consultants, risk management consultants, insurance 
officials, and in-house lawyers communicate ideas about law as they move 
among organizations and participate in conferences, workshops, training ses-
sions, professional networking meetings, and publish professional personnel 
literature (Jacoby, 1985; Baron et al., 1986; Abzug & Mezias, 1993; Edelman 
et al., 1993; Edelman et al., 2001; Edelman et al., 2011; Talesh, 2015). Profes-
sional associations, conferences, and other forums offer opportunities for the 
diffusion of new solutions to perceived managerial problems such as the threat 
of employment lawsuits (Edelman et al., 1992; Bisom-Rapp, 1996, 1999). 
 
The professionalization of legal services by legal and non-legal actors is 
coupled with the filtering of law through various organizational logics opera-
ting among particular fields or industries. New institutional organizational so-
ciology studies reveal how law becomes managerialized as values such as ra-
tionality, efficiency, and management discretion operating within an organiza-
tional field influence the way in which organizations understand law, legality, 
and compliance (Edelman et al., 2001). More recently, scholars have started 
to broaden the framework beyond managerialization and explore how other 
non-managerial logics influence the way that organizations understand the 
meaning of law and in particular, the role of intermediaries who are not legal 
professionals (Pélisse, 2014, 2016). Consumer, risk, science and prison lo-
gics emanating in various organizational fields can influence the way that 
organizations understand the meaning of law (Stryker, Docka, & Wald 2012; 
Verma, 2015; Talesh, 2012, 2014, 2015a, b). Managerial logics can be in 
contestation with logics or work in complimentary ways (Talesh, 2015a). 
Moreover, managerial, risk, labor or consumer conceptions of law shape the 
way public legal institutions such as legislatures (Talesh 2009, 2014; Pélisse, 
2009), courts (Edelman et al., 1999; Edelman, 2005, 2007; Edelman et al., 
2011), regulatory agencies (Talesh, 2012, 2015c) and arbitration forums 
(Talesh, 2012) understand law and compliance. 
The following offers a new institutional theory of law and social change to 
explain the how—under this altered regulatory environment—legal in-
termediaries facilitate and inhibit social change. Using a new institutional 
framework, we focus on two key mechanisms through which rule in-
termediaries influence social change: the professionalization of legal ser-
vices by non-legal actors and the filtering and mediation of law through va-
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rious non-legal logics operating in organizational fields. These two me-
chanisms work together and lead to intermediaries facilitating and inhibiting 
social change in various ways. 
Although instrumental, cognitive, political, cultural, normative and constitu-
tive processes identified by political scientists and sociologists remain path-
ways through which law shapes social change, we suggest that legal in-
termediaries are critical actors on the chain between law and social change. 
Specifically, legal intermediary’s professional experience, institutional lo-
gics and understandings of law and compliance are driving forces for facili-
tating and inhibit social change in different situations. Our framework does 
not negate political, cultural, instrumental or normative approaches of law 
and social change that have been previously explored. Strategic political ac-
tion, lobbying, political mobilization, cultural reframing, decoupling, diffu-
sion, and other mechanisms developed in prior work on intermediaries by 
sociologists and political scientists are crucial to understanding the way in-
termediaries impact law and social change. But we suggest that these politi-
cal, cultural, instrumental and even normative processes are often derived 
from and influenced by the increasing professionalization of law by non-
legal actors in organizational fields and how non-legal actors encounter and 
filter what law means through non-legal logics in their institutional environ-
ments. Thus, organizations’ lobbying choices, political mobilization agen-
das, strategic considerations, and cultural and cognitive scripts are often 
drawn from and shaped by the non-legal logics operating in an organizational 
field and the intermediary’s professional experience. In this respect, our fra-
mework provides the “backstory” for what shapes organizations and civil 
society actors’ political, cultural, and instrumental-based choices for how 
best to respond to various laws. 
While we use existing mechanisms previously developed in the new institu-
tional literature, we push them beyond the existing framework. The follo-
wing sections explore empirical research from the United States and France 
to highlight the broad role of intermediaries, the professionalization of law-
related services by non-legal actors and the filtering of law through various 
non-legal logics. Although our analysis starts with research on labor and em-
ployment law, where the majority of new institutional empirical work on ins-
titutional and political mechanisms reside, we apply our framework to a wide 
variety of other areas. In doing so, we highlight the influence that multiple 
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institutional logics have in the manner that organizations influence the mea-
ning of law and compliance. 
Professionalization of Law by Non-Legal Actors and the Rise of  
Managerial Logics 
Research in the area of employment discrimination law highlights how these 
two mechanisms interact and allow intermediaries to inhibit social change. 
We start here in part because the theoretical framework grew out of research 
in this area and because there has been more empirical research on the role 
of intermediaries and social change in the employment area than other areas. 
In the United States, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 promised broad 
protection against employment discrimination but failed to clearly articulate 
what discrimination means or what organizations need to do to avoid discri-
mination (Edelman, 1990, 1992). Faced with legal ambiguity as to how to 
comply with anti-discrimination laws, employers turned to law-related as-
pects of their organizational field for ideas on how to respond. Employers 
responded to employment laws by creating new offices and written rules, 
procedures, and policies in an attempt to achieve legal legitimacy while at 
the same time maintaining managerial power and discretion over employ-
ment decisions. There was also a spread of special offices devoted to civil 
rights issues and special procedures for processing discrimination com-
plaints. Early adoption of these structures was followed by the vast majority 
of other employers (Edelman, 1990, 1992; Dobbin et al., 1993). 
With the increase of anti-discrimination rules, civil rights offices, grievance 
procedures, and other legal structures, legal and non-legal professionals 
working in employment and related fields began to institutionalize these 
structures. In particular, in-house lawyers, human resource officials and af-
firmative action and diversity officers claimed that these structures could in-
sulate organizations from lawsuits and legal liability (Edelman, 2016). In-
house counsel lawyers increasingly embed themselves deep within organi-
zations as they play multi-faceted roles as cop, counselor, and entrepreneur 
(Nelson & Nielson, 2000). The more lawyers become integral to the functio-
nal operation of the organization, the more likely they will use their expertise 
to serve rather than to question managerial values and goals. 
In fact, in-house counsels often work in parallel and complementary ways 
with non-legal intermediaries such as human resource officials and managers 
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or industrial psychologists. Training programs, administered by intra-orga-
nizational professional intermediaries such as human resource officials or 
external consultants help institutionalize managerialized conceptions of law 
and compliance by often claiming that grievance procedures and formal per-
sonnel offices insulate organizations from legal liability (Bisom-Rapp, 1996, 
1999; Edelman, 1992). This approach simultaneously limits law’s impact on 
managerial power while preserving employers’ unfettered discretion. 
The professionalization of legal services by non-legal actors provides a path-
way for law to be filtered by logics emanating from organizational fields. 
Existing empirical research reveals how managerial conceptions of law broa-
den the term “diversity” in a way that disassociates the term from its original 
goal of protecting civil rights (Edelman et al., 2001). For example, manage-
rial rhetoric helped transform the meaning of “diversity” during the 1980s 
and 1990s from the legal ideal of gender and racial representation to a ma-
nagerial ideal that accepts and incorporates different backgrounds and 
viewpoints in a workforce for productive purposes (Edelman et al., 2001). 
Similarly, in France, managerial rhetoric transformed principles of discrimi-
nation into managerial categories such as diversity (Bereni, 2009) and recast 
concerns of psychological bullying (Bastard & Cardia-Vonnèche, 2003). 
French scholars have also revealed how laws developed to combat 
unemployment and improve working conditions were transformed and recast 
as opportunities for employers to gain greater flexibility over employee sa-
laries (Pelisse 2004a). Other studies in the United States reveal how mana-
gerialized conceptions of law transform sexual harassment claims into per-
sonality conflicts (Edelman, Erlanger, & Lande, 1993), and deflect or dis-
courage complaints rather than offer informal resolution (Marshall, 2005). 
Managerialized conceptions of law ultimately influences the meaning of ju-
dicial decisions with regard to employment cases. For example, scholars 
show how industrial organizational psychologists, as non-legal intermedia-
ries, helped lay the foundation for disparate impact theory of discrimination 
under Title VII, one that was ultimately adopted by courts (Stryker, Docka, 
& Wald 2012; Stryker, 2011). Relying on science, industrial organizational 
psychologist’s research pertaining to performance-related worker characteris-
tics and performance evaluation for employees and human resource manage-
ment helped influence judicial thinking on disparate impact. Others have 
shown how law becomes endogenous as United States courts often defer to 
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the presence of institutionalized policies and procedures as evidence of non-
discriminatory treatment without evaluating the merits of these procedures 
(Edelman et al., 2011). In the employment law context, non-legal intermedia-
ries that are filtering law’s meaning through a managerial logic have weake-
ned civil rights with largely symbolic structures (Edelman, 2016). These 
compliance policies and procedures exude legitimacy to the public and pu-
blic legal institutions but often do not provide substantive change for em-
ployees in the workplace. As a result, law’s ability to achieve social change 
(in this case, equality and fair workplace governance) has been inhibited by 
intermediaries.4 
The managerialization of law and the accompanying professionalization of 
legal services by non-legal actors is not limited to the United States. Mana-
gers, union members, and employee representatives play an important in-
termediary role in the design and enforcement of employment and labor laws 
in France. Although formal legal professionals such as judges (Willemez, 
2012), lawyers (Pélisse, 2005), labor inspectors (Pélisse, 2004b), and in-
house counsels are involved in the construction of formal law and in its im-
plementation, they played far less of a role in the lived experience of em-
ployees on the ground as collective bargaining became more decentralized 
in the past twenty years. 
For example, labor laws adopted by France concerning the reduction of work 
time at the end of the 1990s devolved a large part of control over wage and 
hour rules to the stakeholders involved in labor relationships. Even though 
wage and hour laws were created by the French government, in action, collec-
tive bargaining became a central location for the construction and interpreta-
tion of labor rights for organizations. Moreover, recent legislation increased 
this trend in France. As a result, an intricate interaction takes place between 
and among various intermediaries during collective bargaining. Human re-
source officials represent employers while union representatives advocate for 
employees in labor disputes. In their representative capacities, these in-
termediaries have discretion to create, implement, and enforce legal rules con-
cerning work time and working conditions such as equal pay among genders. 
                                                 
4 In the employment context, we believe law has largely failed to produce social 
change under all three strands definitions as set forth by Kostiner that we indentified 
in our introduction - instrumental, political, and cultural (Kostiner 2003). 
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One specific example concerns the wage and hour rules of staff and manager 
employees. After a law was passed in 1998 that reduced the work time from 
39 to 35 hours a week, human resource officials and union representatives 
developed an approach for counting the work time of staff and managers by 
days (limited to 217 days a year) rather than hours (counted by weeks). Al-
though employers initially did not want to include staff and managers in the 
wage and hour reduction law, unions, social movements and pressures ema-
nating from the staff and managers themselves within organizations drove 
employers and union representatives to create a new approach that accounts 
for staff and managers in wage and hour laws (Pélisse, 2004; 2009). It is 
important to note that this institutionalized practice developed by human re-
source officials and union representatives was not initially permitted by law. 
However, this process was ultimately adopted into law in 2000. The new law 
resulted from negotiations by high level organizational executives, human 
resource managers, and union representatives. Whereas Edelman’s work of-
ten highlights only how managers, in-house counsel, and human resource 
officials filter law’s meaning through a managerial lens, here we see compe-
ting intermediaries (human resources managers and union representatives) 
with competing logics and values balancing one another in collective bargai-
ning negotiations and influencing the content and meaning of labor law. As 
a result, there is less imbalance of power, or at least more engagement by 
divergent institutional actors with competing goals when law is being cons-
tructed. Moreover, because of the decentralization of collective bargaining 
in labor law, union representatives and even members are more actively in-
volved in negotiations involving not just wages, but other aspects of labor 
rights and governance. 
Moving away from formal employment settings, we see intermediaries play 
a major role for those that are unemployed and are trying to reenter the work-
force. Job counselors in France play a pivotal role in interpreting complex 
and simultaneously ambiguous legal rules pertaining to unemployment and 
welfare. France has an intricate, detailed, and complex set of laws and regu-
lations for workers who are laid off from work for economic reasons. An 
experimental regulation known as the “flexisecurity policy” was developed 
in 2006 by the French government. The policy attempted to simultaneously 
increase flexibility on the job market and legal protection and security for 
employees. This policy was implemented in approximately thirty territories 
in France between 2006 and 2013. In order to continue to be compensated 
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for one year while unemployed, workers who were included in the program 
were required to sign a contract agreeing “to search for a job,” engage in 
“adapted and realist training” programs, and pursue weekly meetings with 
job counselors. These parts of the regulatory policy, as well as the general 
rules for unemployed, were not expressly defined. 
Brun, Corteel, and Pelisse’s study (2012) demonstrated that over a period of 
years, job counselors developed not only a specialized expertise in welfare 
and job skills, but also the legal rules that need to be complied with. In addi-
tion to using empathy and understanding to help workers navigate this pro-
gram, job counselors’ repeated involvement over time allowed them to cons-
truct what it legally means to actively search for a job, participate in training, 
and enhance her professional skills while unemployed (Brun, Corteel, & Pé-
lisse, 2012). Over time, government officials afforded job counselors tre-
mendous deference to construct the meaning of “unemployed.” That is, pro-
fessional job counselors mediated the meaning of unemployment law and 
influenced what these policies require from unemployed workers and what 
unemployed workers were entitled to. Thus, we view job counselors in 
France as not just street level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980; Watkins-Hayes, 
2009), front line workers (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2004) or “agents 
de guichet” (Dubois, 1999, 2010) with discretion to make decisions. Instead, 
job counselors are legal intermediaries actively engaged in constructing the 
meaning of labor and unemployment laws and regulations (Pélisse, 2014). 
In sum, both in formal and informal employment settings, we see a wide 
variety of professionals who are not lawyers and not traditionally thought of 
as legal actors, engaging in legal intermediation. These examples highlight 
how managerial values shape the way human resource managers and officers 
understand law in the United States often in ways that weaken rights. Howe-
ver, we see competing logics from union representatives and job counselors 
press against managerialized conceptions of law in France and preserve labor 
and employee rights to varying degrees. The space between what formal em-
ployment and labor laws state as codified in statutes are given meaning by a 
series of professionals who filter law often through managerial and other va-
lues. Thus, consistent with prior studies, we see cultural meaning making, 
political mobilization, and strategic action in various capacities. However, 
our analysis suggests that what is driving these institutional and political me-
chanisms are the logics emanating from organizational fields and how va-
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rious non-legal professionals tasked with implementing law filter law’s mea-
ning through these logics. Human resource officials, union representatives, 
managers, and job counselors influence the law on the books, the law in ac-
tion, and legality itself. 
Professionalization of Law by Non-Legal Actors and the Role of Risk Lo-
gics 
Institutional and political mechanisms mobilized by intermediaries are not 
just driven by managerial logics. In another related area, there has been con-
siderable focus on how risk logics can mediate law’s meaning. In particular, 
different professions are anchored in different logics and these logics can 
shape the lens through which law is interpreted, implemented, and even cons-
tructed. The insurance field, for example, uses the logic of risk to shape the 
way organizations that purchase certain lines of insurance understand law 
and compliance. The following highlights three ways the insurance field acts 
as a legal intermediary. We then pivot away from insurers and demonstrate 
how risk management principles are used by safety officers in scientific la-
boratories. 
Insurance Company Intermediation of Employment Law 
In response to perceived threats of employment discrimination lawsuits, in-
surance companies began offering Employment Practice Liability Insurance 
(EPLI). Unlike prior forms of business insurance that expressly excludes co-
verage for liability arising out of employment practices, EPLI policies pro-
vide insurance defense and indemnification coverage to employers for claims 
of discrimination (e.g., age, sex, race, disability) and other employment-re-
lated allegations made by employees, former employees, or potential em-
ployees. Insurers increasingly offer EPLI and employers increasingly pur-
chase this insurance (Talesh 2015a, b). Insurers play a role in averting such 
risk and act as a regulatory intermediary because employers have an incen-
tive to avoid discrimination; however, insurers do so in a way that focuses 
on avoiding litigation rather than fostering a discrimination-free work envi-
ronment. 
Specifically, the insurance field (insurance companies, agents, brokers, and 
risk management consultants), through EPLI and the accompanying risk ma-
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nagement services that the insurance field offers, construct the threat of em-
ployment law and influence the nature of civil rights compliance (Talesh, 
2015a). Drawing from participant observation and interviews at EPLI confe-
rences across the country as well as content analysis of EPLI policies, loss-
prevention manuals, EPLI industry guidelines, and webinars, Talesh shows 
how insurance companies and institutions use a risk-based logic and institu-
tionalize a way of thinking centered on risk management and reduction. Fa-
ced with uncertain and unpredictable legal risk concerning potential discri-
mination violations, insurance institutions elevate the risk and threat in the 
legal environment and offer a series of risk management services that they 
argue will avert risk for employers that purchase EPLI. 
By framing employers’ legal environment in these terms, the insurance in-
dustry creates a space to encourage employers to engage in managerialized 
responses and develop formalized policies and procedures by using the va-
rious risk-management services offered by insurers to help reduce these 
risks. Thus, in this instance, risk and managerial values work in a compli-
mentary manner and allow insurers as rule intermediaries greater influence 
over compliance issues concerning employers. 
Insurers encourage employers to purchase EPLI because these insurance po-
licies and the value-added risk management services that insurers offer will 
reduce employers’ risk. In particular, EPLI insurers offer a variety of risk-
management services to employers that try to provide a regulatory check on 
employer discriminatory practices. ELPI insurers conduct compliance audits 
of employers and offer employers a confidential legal hotline that allows em-
ployers to ask legal questions to insurer-sponsored lawyers. They also pro-
vide employee handbooks and employment “contract builders” to employers 
so that they can construct a handbook and develop contracts without actually 
drafting the documents (Talesh, 2015a). 
EPLI insurers influence the meaning of compliance with anti-discrimination 
laws in a number of ways. For example, conferences, training programs, loss-
prevention manuals, and insurance policy language provide an opportunity 
for the insurance field actors to build discretion into legal rules. In other 
words, insurance companies develop policy language, which provides work-
arounds to certain legal rules clearly forbidding insurance coverage for cer-
tain acts or omissions in civil rights contexts. 
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For example, the insurability of punitive damages highlights how the insu-
rance field builds discretion into legal rules. Even though civil rights laws 
can potentially subject employers to punitive damages and many states pro-
hibit the insurability of such damages, EPLI insurers build discretion into 
their policies and broaden coverage to include punitive damages by including 
“most favored venue” clauses into their policies. In particular, these clauses 
indicate that the enforceability of insurance coverage shall be governed by 
the applicable law that most favors coverage for punitive and exemplary da-
mages. Not surprisingly, insurance companies state jurisdictions in their po-
licies, which the insurance companies must consult in determining insurabi-
lity, that often permit coverage for punitive damages. Thus, even though sta-
tutes and caselaw often prohibit coverage for punitive damages, these da-
mages are covered by EPLI. Under the framework of risk management and 
risk aversion, EPLI limits the ability of state and federal civil rights laws to 
hold employers directly responsible for paying punitive damages because 
employers now have the ability to transfer these costs to insurers. EPLI in-
surers are stepping in and providing services in a manner that makes the re-
gulatory impact of certain anti-discrimination laws and ultimately social 
change harder to achieve. 
In addition, insurance companies also reframe legal rules and principles 
around a non-legal risk logic that focuses on averting risk and making dis-
crimination claims against employers more defensible. For example, insurers 
spend considerable time at conferences and training sessions discussing a 
relatively new workplace issue that is now being increasingly litigated by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers: workplace bullying. Although insurance institutions have 
an opportunity to encourage more lawful conduct in light of changing anti-
discrimination laws, insurance field actors shift responsibility for fostering a 
safe and positive workplace away from employers. They do so by communi-
cating how EPLI provides coverage for employers in the event that an em-
ployee is found liable for bullying (Talesh, 2015). Insurers are simply trans-
ferring risk without providing preventative guidance. 
Insurers do engage in loss prevention, but do so in a manner that is filtered 
by risk-management logics. Law comes to be viewed and understood as risk. 
While EPLI and the series of risk-management services offered with the in-
surance policy can potentially improve employment practices and com-
pliance, EPLI risk-management services may at times shape compliance in a 
way that leans more toward making claims defensible rather than fostering a 
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discrimination-free workplace.  
Despite the questionable regulatory outputs of insurers as risk managers in 
the employment context, there is considerable deference to EPLI by public 
legal institutions, such as courts, legislatures, and regulatory institutions. In 
particular, federal, state, and municipal governments adopt the risk logics of 
EPLI insurers and encourage, and at times require, public organizations and 
governmental institutions to purchase EPLI (Talesh, 2015b). 
Insurer risk-management services can have positive and negative impacts on 
social change. On the one hand, insurer risk management practices may re-
flect some best practices and lead to improved employment policies and 
procedures and greater equality in the workplace. On the other hand, they 
may also make it easier for employers to develop policies and procedures 
without actively participating in the creation of these policies and 
procedures. In particular, insurance company guidance on these issues lar-
gely focuses on how to avoid litigation as opposed to providing guidance on 
how to maintain a discrimination-free work environment. Similar to mana-
gers and human resource officials in the employment context (Edelman, 
2016), here the insurance field filters law through a non-legal risk logic in 
ways that make law’s ability to achieve social change harder. 
Insurance Company Intermediation of Corporate Law 
Sometimes intermediaries are well-positioned to engage in social change but 
choose not to. For example, insurance companies offering directors’ and of-
ficers’ insurance to directors and officers of a corporation have opportunities 
to engage in loss and risk prevention and discourage wrongful or even illegal 
behavior, but fail to take action. Concerns of corporate malfeasance by di-
rectors and officers of corporations at the expense of shareholders and broa-
der notions of corporate social responsibility remain present in the increa-
singly global economy. Empirical studies of the relationship between direc-
tors’ and officers’ insurance and corporate actors reveals that directors’ and 
officers’ insurance (D&O) significantly weakens the deterrent effect of sha-
reholder litigation and thus undermines such private attorney general suits as 
forms of regulation (Baker & Griffith, 2010). Despite having financial in-
centives to do so, D&O insurers neither monitor nor provide loss prevention 
programs to the corporations they insure. In particular, D&O insurers do not 
condition the sale of insurance on adopting loss-prevention policies. Brokers 
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and risk managers note that loss prevention advice is not very valued or bin-
ding on public corporations (Baker & Griffith, 2010).  
Moreover, insurers rarely try to influence or change corporate behavior. 
While insurers servicing private corporations routinely provide corporations 
access to newsletters, conferences, and written materials relating to good go-
vernance, insurers do not condition insurance coverage on adopting any go-
vernance practice, providing loss-prevention audits, or even providing clear 
discounts for adopting what insurers might consider good corporate go-
vernance standards.  
Thus, despite the availability of shareholder lawsuits to protect the corpora-
tion and curb corporate misconduct, corporate executives purchase D&O in-
surance with shareholder money and essentially shift the vast majority of 
malfeasance and misconduct risks away from themselves while operating at 
a publicly traded company. Whereas EPLI insurers filter law’s meaning 
through a lens of risk mitigation and avoidance, insurers offer little advice or 
risk management and top executives ask for little assistance in monitoring or 
managing the day-to-day operations. Thus, intermediaries in this instance 
have opportunities to improve the legal and ethical conduct of corporate di-
rectors and effectuate positive social change, but do not. 
Insurance Company Intermediation of Privacy Law and Data Theft 
On a more positive note, insurance companies in the past decade have inter-
vened in the area of privacy law and data theft with some substantive impact. 
Cybersecurity risks are among the biggest new threats facing businesses and 
most consumers. Governments, businesses, and society at large are all con-
cerned about private data being stolen or misappropriated. In addition to cau-
sing financial and public relations damage, and threatening an organization’s 
survival, organizations also face a myriad of compliance challenges as they 
are forced to navigate between the various federal and state laws and regula-
tions concerning the collection and use of personal data. Organizations face 
difficult challenges in terms of complying with these laws. Although many 
organizations do have formal policies in place, the majority of organizations 
do not believe that they are sufficiently prepared for a data breach, do not 
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devote adequate money, training, and resources toward protecting consu-
mer’s electronic information from data breaches, and fail to perform proper 
risk assessments (Talesh 2017a). 
The insurance field stepped in and, in the last decade, began offering cyber 
insurance. Cyber insurance is insurance designed to provide both first-party 
loss and third-party liability coverage for data breach events, privacy viola-
tions, and cyberattacks. Recent research suggests that insurance companies 
and institutions, through cyber liability insurance, do not simply pool and 
transfer an insured’s risk to an insurance company or provide defense and 
indemnification services to an insured. In addition to transferring risk, 
research suggests that cyber insurance provides a series of risk management 
services that actively shape the way an organization’s various departments 
tasked with dealing with data breach, such as in-house counsel, information 
technology, compliance, public relations, and other organizational units, res-
pond to data breach. Cyber insurers are acting as compliance regulators and 
trying to prevent, detect, and respond to data breaches and help organizations 
comply with various privacy laws. Thus, cyber insurers frame the legal en-
vironment in terms of risk and then encourage corporations to use their risk 
management services to avoid data breaches and privacy law violations 
(Talesh, 2017).  
Many of the issues that arise during a data breach that are often handled by 
internal departments within an organization, such as legal, compliance, in-
formation technology and public relations/crisis management, are now being 
managed by insurance industry professionals or third-party vendors that in-
surance companies offer to assist organizations at a reduced fee. Cyber insu-
rance provides a pathway for insurance institutions to act as external com-
pliance monitors and managers of organizational behavior with respect to 
data theft. Insurers and the third-party vendors that they contract with are 
stepping in and offering risk management services aimed at preventing, de-
tecting, and responding to data breach (Talesh, 2017a,b).  
Cyber insurance covers not just legal defense and indemnification costs as-
sociated with a covered loss, but the legal, forensic investigation, business 
interruption, crisis management, and credit monitoring and restoration ex-
penses. However, insurers do not just pay for the costs of these services, they 
also provide access to services aimed at responding to, investigating, defen-
ding, and mitigating against the consequences surrounding a data breach 
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event or privacy law violation. For example, cyber insurers help organiza-
tions respond when a cyber security system is breached, identify the source 
and cause of the data breach, contain the breach, and ultimately restore the 
network processes that may have been damaged as a result of the breach. To 
address these problems, cyber insurers or their third-party vendors offer 
forensic cyber security experts to organizations.  
Another major threat organizations face when a data breach occurs is severe 
damage to its reputation. Cyber insurance addresses this risk by covering the 
costs to retain the services of a public relations and crisis management firm. 
However, cyber insurers go beyond providing coverage by offering a series of 
preapproved public relations and crisis management firms that the insured can 
retain at a reduced premium. Insurers perform similar intermediary roles with 
regard to legal services and credit monitoring and restoration (Talesh, 2017).  
When evaluating the totality of services that the insurers offer organizations, 
such as the legal services, forensics, public relations, and crisis management, 
the insurer can be seen as the manager and regulator of cyber security risks. 
Given the under-preparation and under-compliance by businesses and des-
pite the insurer’s financial incentives, institutionalized risk management 
techniques developed within the insurance field can potentially improve or-
ganizational practices and compliance concerning data breach. Most organi-
zations view insurer interventions as value added because existing research 
suggests that most organizations believe that they are underprepared for data 
breach and under compliant with privacy laws. After all, both organizations 
and consumers benefit when insurers prevent data breaches.  
In sum, we see insurance organizations and risk management professionals 
filtering the meaning of employment, corporate and privacy law through a 
lens of risk and managerial logics. Insurance professionals working with the 
insurance industry go beyond their traditional services offered and with dif-
ferent degrees of intensity and effectiveness, try to shape the way organiza-
tions comply with laws. In this respect, insurers are performing a regulatory 
function and impacting social change, although with varying degrees of suc-
cess. Thus, we should think of insurers as regulatory intermediaries as not 
always a good or bad endeavor, but instead, on a continuum. 
There are important distinctions between directors and officers and cyber 
contexts. Directors and officers are not interested in being told how to engage 
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in risk averse behavior. Policyholders in the cyber context, however, are in-
terested in the insurance defense and indemnity coverage but also the accom-
panying risk management services that can prevent, detect, and respond to a 
data breach event. The professional risk management services that accom-
pany cyber insurance also fill a knowledge gap for the organization both with 
respect to how to deal with actual threats but also the increasing complex 
maze of rules organizations must comply with. Because of the variety of pri-
vacy laws and rules and the challenges of preventing data breaches, organi-
zations are willing to use risk management tools that deal with the latest cy-
ber threats that it lacks internal tools to defend against. In contrast, directors 
and officers believe they possess the requisite professional knowledge and 
experience to manage a corporation responsibly and are less eager to receive 
insurance risk management recommendations. 
Differences also exist between the EPLI and cyber contexts. EPLI insurers 
try to shape the meaning of law for employers tasked with dealing with dis-
crimination laws whereas cyber insurers spend far less time mediating law’s 
meaning and far more time trying to enhance an organization’s ability to de-
tect and respond when faced with a data breach. Unlike in the EPLI context, 
the cyber insurance risk management tools are less about simply avoiding 
being sued and more about developing processes to prevent or limit any data 
breach problem from occurring.  
We are cautious to make broad sweeping claims based on these three case 
studies since the social and legal context of each case differs. Whether an 
intermediary can facilitate or inhibit social change depends on a variety of 
factors. It appears, however, that insurer-sponsored intermediation is more 
likely to be accepted and followed when the interests of the powerful regu-
lated actors are aligned with consumers. For example, the incentives are bet-
ter aligned between organizations and consumers concerning cybersecurity 
threats. Given the financial, legal, and reputational harm of a data breach 
event and that existing research suggests that organizations are currently 
unable to keep up with cyber threats, no organization benefits from a cybe-
rattack. Thus, businesses purchasing cyber insurance are interested in using 
these risk management tools to prevent and detect risks because it helps itself 
and its clients. 
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The Use of Risk Management in Non-Insurance Settings: Safety Officers 
in Scientific Laboratories 
Risk logics do not just influence the insurance field or actors that interact 
with insurance companies. Risk reduction and risk management principles 
shape the way professional safety officers interpret and implement a variety 
of environmental, health and safety rules (Silbey, 2017). Professional safety 
officers for many industries have to ensure compliance with various interna-
tional laws, industry guidelines, and government agency mandates aimed at 
protecting the environment and worker’s health and safety. Safety officers in 
scientific laboratories in France and the United States use their extensive 
training and technical skills and knowledge concerning safety, chemical pro-
ducts, and health risks to interpret and implement many legal regulations 
surrounding health and safety in work settings. They implement surveillance 
technology and databases to manage hazards (Silbey and Agrawal, 2011) and 
develop “relational regulation practices” in science laboratories (Huising and 
Silbey, 2011). Safety officers also use the authority of legal rules to manage 
risks, influence safe practices, and build good working conditions (Pélisse, 
2017; Borelle et Pélisse, 2017).  
Environmental, health and safety regulations issued by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
States and many municipalities are often quite complex and filled with tech-
nical requirements and language. They are also vague and overbroad with 
respect to how to comply. For example, many environmental and safety re-
gulations are not applicable or easily implementable toward nanoparticles 
and nanomaterials (Pélisse, 2017). The primary regulations in Europe for the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals are lar-
gely inapplicable to nanoparticles. In particular, these regulations only re-
quire that chemicals produced at greater than one ton per year be registered 
and evaluated for authorization. There is very little evaluation of risks and 
hazards in Europe for chemicals that produce less than one ton. Even though 
some nanoparticles probably have a hazardous effect on the health for 
workers or consumers, these regulations are largely inapplicable to nanopar-
ticles due to its very small size and weight. To fill this gap, industry associa-
tions and many countries have tried to provide more direct guidance. The 
European Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health 
Risks (SCENIHR) proposed recommendations for the countries and organi-
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zations producing or importing nanomaterials. In France, the National Insti-
tute for Research on Safety (INRS) also drafted guidelines for labs, centers, 
and organizations that research issues involving nanoscience. France was 
also the first (and still sole) country in the world to implement a national and 
annual register for nanoparticles and nanomaterials (named R-nano).5 While 
there has been progress, these regulations still leave considerable ambiguity 
concerning how to implement and enforce rules pertaining to nanoparticles. 
Also, hazards related to nanoparticles and materials are very often uncertain. 
Even though health and safety regulations often contemplate environmental 
“precautionary” principles (Drais, 2017), advances in science and techno-
logy have made complying with these regulatory provisions difficult to im-
plement. Moreover, each laboratory operates with internal guidelines and 
rules emanating from its own research institution or university. Thus, exter-
nal legal rules and internal guidelines at universities leave considerable room 
for implementation. 
Amidst this legal environment, safety officers play an important in-
termediary role in trying to facilitate compliance with external legal rules 
and internal guidelines (Huising and Silbey, 2011). Similar to employment 
and insurance settings, safety officers have professional training and 
knowledge relating to safety, chemical products, and health risks. They com-
bine their knowledge of health and safety with a working understanding of 
legal regulations. Safety officers influence safety offices in the universities 
but also the labs themselves. Their consistent presence and role remind the 
technicians, graduate students, and professors that concerns over that safety 
procedures, risk reduction and risk management are useful, necessary, and 
mandatory (Pélisse, 2017). 
When safety officers work in the safety offices, they translate legal rules, 
best practices or recommendations of EU, national agencies or local regula-
tors related to various biological, chemical, and nanoparticle risks and con-
vert them into practical regulations. They prescribe how to weigh nanopar-
ticles in the bench fume-hoods, and identify what experiments must be con-
ducted in secure and sealed glovebox settings. They also determine what 
tools or equipment workers are permitted to use and what type of lab-coats 
have to be worn in the lab. They draft and develop procedures and policies 
and conduct annual inspections to evaluate whether these policies have been 
                                                 
5 French regulations were revised in 2012 with the Grenelle II Laws. 
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implemented. Safety officers couple their working knowledge of the law 
with a focus on risk prevention and safety.  
But safety officers are not the sole actors that deal with health and safety. 
Permanent engineers or technicians in French labs often perform a safety 
oversight function while Principal Investigators in the United States often 
select PhD graduate students to be “safety representatives.” Although these 
actors are only partially focused on safety issues and legal responsibility re-
mains the responsibility of the directors, Principal Investigators, or Univer-
sities, these safety representatives adapt and implement the rules daily. Sa-
fety representatives must engage in risk management and risk reduction 
amidst an environment where scientists are eager to test and conduct experi-
ments that push the boundaries of what is permissible. This is a difficult chal-
lenge (Borelle and Pélisse, 2017). Scientists consider themselves experts and 
most qualified on how to conduct experiments in a safe manner. Therefore, 
scientists are not always eager to accept feedback from safety representatives 
and safety officers. Nevertheless, safety actors in the laboratories and uni-
versities try to fill in the meaning of ambiguous and complex legal mandates 
and simultaneously balance concerns over law, science, and risk reduction. 
Safety officers and representatives are uniquely poised to act as regulatory 
intermediaries because they possess professional expertise on risk reduction 
and safety but also understand the legal mandates. Because the risks to scien-
tists are often high, safety officers take their compliance role seriously. Sa-
fety officers and safety representatives, therefore, are crucial intermediaries 
for ensuring the safety and health of workers in science labs (Huising and 
Silbey, 2011; Pélisse, 2017; Borelle et Pélisse, 2017). The rise in litigation 
and legal liability surrounding laboratory accidents across the world has led 
to more scrutiny and evaluation of lab safety policies and in particular, the 
role of safety officers.6 
Thus, there are employment, corporate, privacy, and safety laws across the 
world aimed at particular social causes, such as preserving equality in the 
                                                 
6 In the United States, the deadly accident at the chemical laboratory at UCLA in 
2008 brought scientific safety requirements in direct interaction with legal liability 
and standards of care. The case ultimately resulted in a settlement but not after tre-
mendous attention and scrutiny concerning safety requirements in laboratories. Si-
milarly, scientists in France have been victims of major asbestos accidents in uni-
versity labs that also resulted in legal scrutiny. 
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workplace, making sure our corporations operate free of fraud and 
malfeasance, maintaining the privacy of organizations’ and people’s perso-
nal and financial information, and keeping our world environmentally safe. 
Whether these laws succeed in their goals is often determined by the way 
professional intermediaries interpret, implement, and construct legal regula-
tions. These examples suggest that non-legal intermediaries such as insu-
rance professionals and safety actors often filter what law means through a 
risk logic. At times we see intermediaries nudging organizations toward stra-
tegic action. At other times, we see intermediaries encouraging organizations 
to adopt taken for granted norms operating among the organizational field. 
However, the political, strategic, and even cultural meaning making activi-
ties appear to be derived from the managerial and risk logics through which 
intermediaries filter law’s meaning. Further research on how organizational 
actors influence law’s meaning through a logic of risk should explore whe-
ther there are potentially multiple types of risks and consequently, multiple 
risk logics. 
Professionalization of Law by Non-Legal Actors and the Rise of Consumer 
Logics 
Thus far, our examples highlight how non-legal professionals often shape 
law through different logics when implementing law within organizations. 
This impacts the law in action but also law-related ideas, ideals, principles, 
and rituals that permeate society (legality). But non-legal professionals are 
also playing a big role in shaping law’s meaning in more formalized dispute 
resolution forums or what socio-legal scholars refer to as the law on the 
books. Manufacturers, for example, mediate consumer protection legislation 
in ways that impact the likelihood that consumer protection laws will bring 
about social change. Although lobbying and interest group politics remain at 
the fore-front, what organizations choose to lobby for is often an outgrowth 
of the logics operating within organizational fields.  
Through a quantitative coding and qualitative content analysis of 25 years of 
legislative history and interviews with legislative analysts involved in craf-
ting both laws in California and Vermont, Talesh (2014) shows how auto-
mobile manufacturers, who were initially subject to a powerful consumer 
warranty law in California in 1971, transformed and ultimately weakened the 
impact of this law by creating their own dispute resolution venues. As these 
legalized structures became institutionalized among the organizational field 
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and eventually run by third-party organizational surrogates, manufacturers 
infused business values into California legislation in varying degrees through 
lobbying and reshaped the meaning of law and compliance among not just 
organizations, but the legislature. The analysis reveals that consumer protec-
tion legislation became amended and weakened over time as businesses va-
lues increasingly dominated the legislative process. As a result of such le-
gislation, consumer rights and remedies became largely contingent on first 
using third-party dispute resolution structures funded by manufacturers 
where rights and remedies equivalent to those available in court do not exist. 
The legislature’s perceptions of manufacturer dispute resolution structures 
as efficient and the proper forum for these conflicts was culturally condi-
tioned around manufacturers’ norms and beliefs that private dispute resolu-
tion was the appropriate mechanism for conflict resolution.  
As was the case in California, the Vermont legislature in 1984 reached con-
sensus that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) forums as opposed to courts 
were the proper place to resolve legal disputes. However, the contested and 
varying political alliances in Vermont, as well as a different developmental 
“path” (cf. Pierson 2004), led to a different dispute resolution structure being 
codified into law. In particular, different interest groups, namely, consumer 
advocates and automotive dealers, dominated the Vermont legislative pro-
cess. A political trade off ensued among key stakeholders such as automotive 
dealers, manufacturers, consumer advocates, and the state attorney general, 
whereby a court option was eliminated from consideration in return for per-
mitting the state of Vermont to administer a dispute resolution structure in 
addition to allowing the private dispute resolution process to operate.  
Once consumer protection law is privatized, institutionalized and competing 
logics operating among stakeholders and organizations play an important 
role in determining how lemon laws are implemented in arbitration systems 
operating outside courts with various levels of involvement by private orga-
nizations, state actors, and civil society stakeholders (Talesh 2012). Despite 
having similar formal laws on the books, the law in action operating in dif-
ferent private and state-run lemon law dispute resolution forums is very dif-
ferent based on the way business and consumer perspectives are accounted 
for in each dispute resolution process.  
Talesh’s (2012) research revealed that under the single-arbitrator private dis-
pute resolution system run by private organizations with soft state oversight, 
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business values flow into the rules, the procedures, and the meaning of law 
operating in the private dispute resolution system mainly through an exten-
sive training and socialization process for arbitrators. For example, in Cali-
fornia, the consumer lemon law arbitration program is run by private third-
party administrators who champion themselves as experts in dispute resolu-
tion. These third-party administrators are professional organizations and ex-
perts in dispute resolution. They also design and facilitate arbitration pro-
grams in various capacities. In this instance, these third-party administrators 
recast law through a managerial lens. Specifically, they teach arbitrators to 
disregard any prior knowledge of legal processes and strictly follow what 
they are taught in the training processes. Arbitration trainers emphasize ma-
nagerial values such as efficiency, discretion, and flexibility with respect to 
applying formal law in these processes. This philosophical orientation is a 
key mechanism for explaining how organizations shape the meaning of law 
(Talesh, 2012).  
On the other hand, the state-run dispute resolution system in Vermont con-
sists of a five person arbitration board of three citizens, an automotive dealer 
and a technical expert. Vermont’s arbitration system anchors the neutrality 
and legitimacy of its dispute resolution structure in a collaborative justice 
model that balances interested stakeholders reflecting business and consumer 
logics in a state funded and designed structure. Vermont’s panel of arbitra-
tors receives minimal formal training and socialization. The little training 
they do receive largely focuses on assuring that they apply formal law. Ver-
mont arbitrators believe the effectiveness of the lemon law arbitration board 
is contingent on the right mixture of people offering different consumer and 
business perspectives while still operating within the requirements of formal 
law. To the extent business values are introduced into the process by the pre-
sence of the automotive dealer and technical expert arbitrators on the lemon 
law board, they seem to be balanced with competing consumer values by the 
presence of three citizen arbitrators.  
In Vermont, these same core legal principles rest on interest representation 
and balancing business and consumer logics in the dispute resolution system. 
Data on who wins these arbitrations reveals that consumers are twice as li-
kely to win in Vermont as they are to lose in California (Talesh, 2012). Thus, 
consistent with prior new institutional studies (Edelman & Stryker, 2005), 
politics and institutional meaning making mechanisms matter. But Talesh’s 
analysis reveals how business and consumer logics influence the content and 
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meaning of legislation, the institutional design of dispute resolution systems, 
and have important implications for consumers’ access to justice and more 
broadly, the civil legal system (Talesh, 2009, 2012, 2014). This comparative 
analysis is especially useful for our analysis because it shows how the pro-
fessionalization of law by non-legal actors (manufacturers and third-party 
arbitration administrators) and the filtering of non-legal logics can both inhi-
bit and facilitate social change based on the ways these logics are incorpo-
rated into consumer protection legislation and the design of the dispute reso-
lution process. 
Legal Intermediaries: Lessons Learned and an Ongoing Research 
Agenda 
Law and social change has and will continue to be an important issue for 
scholars and policymakers to wrestle with. While prior research has done an 
excellent job of shedding light on the normative, instrumental, political, and 
cultural processes through which law produces social change, our approach 
helps explain the underlying mechanisms that drive those different pro-
cesses. In particular, strategic, political, cultural, and institutional ideas and 
tactics through which law is influenced are often derived from and shaped 
by the increasing professionalization of law by non-legal actors and how 
these non-legal actors encounter and filter what law means through non-legal 
logics. Our new institutional theoretical framework highlights how the over-
lap between organizational and legal fields often leads to a mix of organiza-
tional and legal logics that influence the way organizations and other stake-
holders understand and implement laws.  
In addition to this core finding, we believe our framework reveals a number 
of broader lessons that should guide future research on the study of in-
termediaries and their role in social change. First, we lay out the conditions 
that have led to increasing involvement by intermediaries in law’s construc-
tion and meaning. We suggest that discussions of law and social change need 
to focus less on whether and when formal legal institutions can facilitate 
legal change. In particular, the location of legal rulemaking has changed. 
While command and control, top-down regulation exists, there has been a 
pivot globally toward more co-regulation, self-regulation and the contracting 
out of rights to civil society actors, businesses, and other stakeholders. 
Moreover, there are more laws and legal regulations than ever before and 
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these legal mandates are also complex and ambiguous with respect to how 
to comply. The move from government to governance and the increasing 
complexity and ambiguity of legal rules gives intermediaries greater space 
to actually construct what law and compliance means in action. Thus, whe-
ther law can produce social change is not as contingent on the behavior of 
formal legal actors connected to public legal institutions but instead, in-
termediaries. These actors are positioned to play an even greater role in de-
termining whether law can facilitate or inhibit social change. Future scho-
larship on law and social change should be mindful of the changed conditions 
for fostering social change.  
Second, this article highlights the variation of intermediaries along a number 
of dimensions. For example, intermediaries are both legal and non-legal ac-
tors. The obvious remains true: lawyers, law firms, and in-house counsel and 
actors connected to formal legal institutions such as judges, legislators, and 
regulators play an important role in interpreting and shaping the meaning of 
legal rules. But non-legal actors such as job counselors, safety officers, hu-
man resource officers, labor union representatives, managers, financial ana-
lysts, insurance companies, risk managers, and insurance brokers also play a 
key and less recognized role in facilitating and inhibiting social change, 
through their daily uses of the legal rules that they handle in their professio-
nal practices. The increasing complexity of legal rules and the rise of profes-
sionalized services create a space for new and more de-centered actors to 
take on quasi-legal roles. 
Third, intermediaries are not just confronting law in traditional legal settings. 
Rather, intermediaries impact a wide variety of industries and settings, ran-
ging from labor and employment, cybersecurity, corporate behavior, arbitra-
tion, consumer protection, welfare, and health and safety. At every turn, there 
are formal laws and regulations. However, there is also tremendous discre-
tion and space for organizations and individuals to implement these laws. 
Given the pivot away from command and control regulation to more public-
private actors involving civil society actors and stakeholders, we anticipate 
intermediaries playing an ever greater role in years to come across a variety 
of areas.  
Fourth, the idea of law as an instrument of social change cannot be divorced 
from organizational fields and more importantly, the field logics operating 
among actors that are tasked with complying with laws (Edelman & Stryker, 
  LIEPP Working Paper n° 73 
 
 
 37 
 
2005). We note that the importance of institutional logics has been discussed 
previously (Edelman & Stryker, 2005). But we purposely move beyond 
examples to show the broad influence we believe legal intermediaries have 
and in particular, how field logics influence the way that intermediaries un-
derstand and construct law. Our case studies across the United States and 
France repeatedly demonstrate that law is filtered through multiple and 
sometimes contested logics and these logics allow field actors to filter and 
mediate law’s meaning in very powerful ways. Whereas early work focused 
on how managerial values filter law’s meaning, here, we present a more com-
plex picture where multiple and competing logics shape the way organiza-
tions go about complying with laws.  
Given the increasing deference to organizations with respect to implemen-
ting law, risk, managerial, and consumer logics can steer legal interpretation 
and implementation in different directions and impact law’s capacity to pro-
duce progressive social change in various ways. Our framework highlights 
how intermediaries contribute or inhibit to social change, regardless of whe-
ther we define social change along the instrumental, political and cultural 
dimensions as set forth by Kostiner (2003). Legal intermediaries contribute 
to concrete material changes for employees, unemployed workers, scientists, 
managers, including helping find unemployed workers new jobs, preserving 
wage and hour equity, or bolstering cybersecurity defenses. They also con-
tribute to or inhibit political dimensions of social change by empowering 
employees against managers in collective bargaining labor negotiations, and 
mobilizing an increased discourse around safety in scientific laboratories. 
However, intermediaries often use managerial and risk logics to weaken con-
sumer protection legislation, and encourage employers to develop symbolic 
policies and procedures and consequently, make it less likely that employers 
can be sued for employment violations. Finally, legal intermediaries trans-
form not just individual and collective identities, but legality itself. Our case 
studies reveal that intermediaries filtering law through various non-legal lo-
gics redefine the ways to count working time for staff and managers, the 
meaning of a job for an unemployed worker, what constitutes legally com-
pliant safe conditions in laboratories, the meaning of consumer protection 
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law, what constitutes discrimination, and how to comply with anti-discrimi-
nation laws. Sometimes legal intermediary constructions of law facilitate so-
cial change while other times they inhibit it.  
Going forward, we hope our working typology will nudge others to focus on 
the legal intermediary’s ability to shape the content and meaning of law. Al-
though we applaud the increasing examination of regulatory intermediaries 
by scholars across the world (Abbot et al., 2017), existing approaches still 
view law as largely a top-down phenomenon coming from formal legal ins-
titutions. Under this framework, rule-makers “create” law for rule-takers and 
rule intermediaries play a mediating role implementing and monitoring law 
(Abbott et al., 2017). In contrast, our framework suggests that the boundaries 
between rule-makers, rule-takers, and rule intermediaries are much more 
blurred than existing approaches suggest. Legal intermediaries play an in-
creasing role in not just affecting, controlling or monitoring relations bet-
ween rule-makers and rule-takers, but in constructing the content and mea-
ning of law itself. Unlike street-level bureaucrats that use their discretion to 
implement policy on the ground, the intermediaries we examine are actually 
shaping the content and meaning of law among public legal institutions and 
in organizational domains.  
Given the inherent ambiguity in law andlaw’s “fuzziness” (Wroblewski, 
1983) or “undecided” dimension (Amselek, 1991), especially with respect to 
regulatory rules, intermediaries operating within organizational fields are in-
fluencing the content and meaning of legal rules and how these actors un-
derstand law and compliance (Talesh, 2015a,c; Pélisse, 2014, 2016). Moreo-
ver, institutionalized practices that come to be seen as rational often end up 
being deferred to by public legal institutions such as courts, legislatures, and 
administrative agencies. Under our approach, law is an endogenous process 
as intermediaries simultaneously act as rule makers and takers (Edelman, 
2016; Talesh, 2009). Thus, we encourage scholars interested in studying law 
and social change to not be bound by existing frameworks that compartmen-
talize the intermediary role as operating within a world where lawmaking is 
exclusively the province of public legal institutions. Instead, we suggest 
greater attention on intermediaries as actors that construct and shape the mea-
ning of law and various types of legality in different regulatory settings in 
ways that have positive and negative impacts in society. 
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